

10 June 1986

Talking Points for ADDI Appearance Before HPSCI**South Korea: Background on Parliamentary System**

The presidential commission on constitutional reform and the ruling Democratic Justice Party are likely to recommend replacing the present centralized executive system with a "dual executive"--or parliamentary--system, in which a prime minister elected by and responsible to the National Assembly would act as head of government, sharing power with a president acting as head of state.

- Both groups claim to be studying variations of the parliamentary system, but we have no information on their thinking even on such key issues as the division of authority between president and prime minister, how the prime minister would be nominated and elected, or procedures for electing the president and the National Assembly.

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South Korea adopted a parliamentary system following the collapse of the Syngman Rhee government in 1960. That system, which lasted until Park Chung Hee's coup in 1961, sharply curtailed the president's powers, reducing him to little more than a figurehead. Seats in the National Assembly were filled by popularly elected representatives, each representing a separate district.

It is unlikely, in our view, that the ruling camp proposal will go as far in limiting presidential powers. It is also unlikely that it will replace the present indirect presidential elections with direct elections or substitute a system of single-seat legislative districts for the present system, which combines two-seat legislative districts with the assignment of one-third of the seats on a nonelective basis.

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- Currently the party winning the most elected seats is allocated an additional 61 appointive seats, while the other major parties share another 31 appointive seats.
- The present system has allowed the government to easily maintain a near ironclad 55-percent majority in the National Assembly based on 35-percent of the popular vote.

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El Salvador

Dialogue

Agreement by the Duarte Government and the leftist rebel alliance to renew formal talks by August is a tactic by both sides to gain political and diplomatic advantages.

--The rebels' acceptance of the President's proposal follows 18 months of informal contacts and a meeting in Peru in late April between high-level leftist representatives and government officials.

Members of the rebel alliance probably see the talks as way to relieve military pressure and improve their international image, but are divided on a negotiating position.

--The political wing of the alliance is pressing rebel leaders to moderate some of the demands that contributed to the collapse of the 1984 talks. Moderates in the political wing, who hope to regain influence with guerrilla hardliners, may try to sustain the dialogue by establishing the government-insurgent commission agreed to in 1984.

--The Marxist guerrillas, however, are unlikely to concede their long-standing demands for a ceasefire, power-sharing, and an end to US aid to the government.

For his part, Duarte sees new talks as a way to divert public attention from the country's economic problems and the continued fighting.

--The President also may believe that renewed dialogue with the Salvadoran insurgents will increase pressure on Nicaragua to agree to talks with the anti-Sandinistas.

--Pressures are mounting on both Duarte and the insurgents to make

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concessions, which could lead to more serious dialogue than in the past.

--Nonetheless, Duarte will face strong opposition from the armed forces to any concessions to the insurgents. He probably will use the meetings to try to further divide moderate socialist leaders from guerrilla hardliners within the alliance.

The Military Situation

The four ongoing large-scale military operations--complemented by aggressive small-unit actions--reflect improvements in intelligence and coordination and a commitment by the Salvadoran armed forces to sustain its momentum during the current rainy season.

--The operations in different parts of the country are aimed at closing rebel base camps and logistics corridors.

--Small-unit reconnaissance and ambushes have been effective in harassing guerrillas trying to return to old base areas.

--Improved tactical coordination has kept pressure on rebels trying to evade sweep operations by the military.

--Better use of intelligence has enabled the Salvadorans to defeat some rebel attacks.


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El Salvador *Ongoing Military Operations*

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800324 (545437) 5-85

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